Internet-wide scanning for exposed network device management interfaces.
What gives it awayRepeated attempts on an outside interface from many unrelated source addresses, typically hitting SSH and HTTPS in sequence.
ATT&CK T1046Nothing matches that yet. Tell us what you were looking for and it goes on the list.
Cisco Secure Firewall ASA · Event 710003
This is not a blocked connection through the firewall — it is a blocked connection to the firewall. Somebody aimed SSH, HTTPS, or SNMP at the ASA's own interface address and was refused because their address is not on the management allow-list.
Also written as %ASA-3-710003ASA 710003access denied by ACL fromASA-3-710003
The distinction from 106023 is the whole point and it is regularly missed: access lists applied to an interface control traffic passing through the box, while to-the-box management access is governed by the ssh, http, telnet and snmp-server commands, which maintain their own allow-lists. That is why adding a permit line to an interface ACL does not fix a 710003. On an outside interface these should be near-zero — if you are seeing them, the management service is listening on the internet and the only thing standing between an attacker and a login prompt is the allow-list.
Sanitised. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
%ASA-3-710003: TCP access denied by ACL from 203.0.113.44/51222 to outside:198.51.100.1/ssh Everything else in the log line is context.
inside or a management interfaceAlmost always a legitimate administrator whose address is not permitted yet. outsideThe management plane is reachable from the internet. This is the finding, regardless of whether anyone got in. sshAttempted SSH management. The most commonly targeted. httpsThe ASDM or web VPN interface. Note that a genuine remote-access VPN also lives on 443, so context matters here. telnetCleartext management. Should not be enabled at all on a modern configuration. snmpMonitoring access. Frequently left with permissive source ranges. Most of the time it is one of these.
What gives it awayRepeated attempts on an outside interface from many unrelated source addresses, typically hitting SSH and HTTPS in sequence.
ATT&CK T1046What gives it awayPersistent attempts from one external source, often paired with 605004 login-denied messages if any of them reach the service at all.
ATT&CK T1110What gives it awayAttempts arriving on an inside interface from a machine with no administrative role, particularly across several management services in a short window.
ATT&CK T1046index=network sourcetype=cisco:asa "710003" | rex "from (?<src>\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)/\d+ to (?<iface>\w+):(?<dst>\S+)/(?<svc>\w+)" | stats count values(svc) as services by src, iface | sort -count grep '710003' asa.log | awk '{print $NF, $(NF-2)}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -20 Syslog | where SyslogMessage has '710003' | extend src = extract(@'from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)', 1, SyslogMessage) | summarize attempts = count() by src, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | where attempts > 10 106023 is traffic passing through the firewall being denied by an interface access list. 710003 is traffic aimed at the firewall's own address being denied by its management allow-list. The practical consequence is that adding a permit line to an ACL does nothing for a 710003 — the ssh, http, telnet and snmp-server commands are what control that access.
Add their address to the relevant management command, not to an access list. For SSH that is 'ssh <address> <mask> <interface>'; for ASDM it is 'http <address> <mask> <interface>'. Add the specific host rather than the subnet where you can, since these allow-lists are the last line in front of a login prompt.
It means a management service is listening on your internet-facing address and being found. Nobody got in — the allow-list refused them — but the service is reachable and the allow-list is now the only control. The right response is to stop offering management on the outside interface at all and require a VPN connection first.
Cisco assigns severity by message type, not by outcome, and access to the device itself is treated as more serious than access through it. In a log viewer that puts these above ordinary through-traffic denies, which is actually the right priority — but it means a busy inside interface can generate a lot of severity 3 noise from administrators who simply have not been permitted yet.
Last reviewed 6 September 2026