Post-exploitation framework communication.
What gives it awayA pipe created by a process running from a user-writable directory, or by a shell, particularly with a name matching published tooling defaults.
ATT&CK T1071Nothing matches that yet. Tell us what you were looking for and it goes on the list.
Sysmon · Event 17
A process opened a named pipe — a channel other processes can connect to. Windows uses them constantly for legitimate work, but offensive tooling relies on them too, and several frameworks leave recognisable pipe names behind.
Also written as Sysmon 17Sysmon Event ID 17Pipe Creatednamed pipe created sysmon
Only present if you installed Sysmon. Named pipes are an ordinary part of how Windows programs talk to each other.
Two things make pipes useful. Post-exploitation frameworks use them for internal communication and for privilege escalation via impersonation, and default pipe names are published for most well-known tooling. Even randomised names often keep a recognisable structure. Filter to the creating process rather than trying to enumerate every bad name — a shell or a binary in a temp directory creating a pipe is interesting regardless of what it is called.
Sanitised. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
Pipe Created:
RuleName: -
EventType: CreatePipe
UtcTime: 2026-08-28 09:15:19.882
ProcessGuid: {a1b2c3d4-0000-0000-0000-00000000abcd}
ProcessId: 7412
PipeName: \a1b2c3d4e5
Image: C:\Users\jbrooks\AppData\Local\Temp\wh.exe
User: CORP\jbrooks Everything else in the log line is context.
A name matching a known offensive framework defaultDocumented and worth alerting on, though defaults are easily changed. A short random-looking hexadecimal stringCommon for tooling that randomises pipe names. A recognisable Windows pipe nameOrdinary system operation, and most of the volume. A binary in a temp or user profile directoryPrograms there rarely have a legitimate reason to host a pipe. A shell or scripting engineWorth reading. Most of the time it is one of these.
What gives it awayA pipe created by a process running from a user-writable directory, or by a shell, particularly with a name matching published tooling defaults.
ATT&CK T1071What gives it awayA pipe created shortly before a process appears running as SYSTEM, from a session that was not previously privileged.
ATT&CK T1134.002What gives it awayPipe creation on a remote host, visible alongside IPC$ access in Event 5145.
ATT&CK T1021.002Event | where Source == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' and EventID == 17 | where Image has_any ('\\Temp\\','\\AppData\\','\\Users\\Public\\') | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Image, PipeName, User Event | where Source == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' and EventID == 17 | summarize hosts = dcount(Computer) by PipeName | where hosts <= 2 | order by PipeName asc A channel one process creates so others can connect and exchange data, identified by a name rather than a network address. Windows uses them heavily for internal communication and for remote administration over SMB. They are entirely normal — which is exactly why offensive tooling uses them too.
It is worth having and easy to bypass. Published default names for well-known frameworks are trivially changed by anyone who reads the documentation. Detection built on which process is hosting the pipe holds up much better, because a binary in a temp directory hosting a pipe is unusual whatever it calls itself.
Yes, but filter it. Unfiltered it is high volume because Windows creates pipes constantly. Scope it to processes outside normal program directories and to the pipe names your threat intelligence actually covers, and it becomes manageable while keeping the useful part.
Last reviewed 28 August 2026