Timestomping to hide a dropped file.
What gives it awayA file's creation time changed to match surrounding system files, usually shortly after it was written.
ATT&CK T1070.006Nothing matches that yet. Tell us what you were looking for and it goes on the list.
Sysmon · Event 2
A program rewrote a file's creation timestamp. Very little legitimate software does this, and altering timestamps to blend into a directory is a well-known anti-forensics move — which makes this a low-volume, high-signal event.
Also written as Sysmon 2Sysmon Event ID 2timestomping detection
Only present if you installed Sysmon. It records a program changing when a file claims to have been created.
Sysmon reports both the previous and the new value, so you can see what the timestamp was changed from. A file backdated to match the surrounding directory is the classic pattern. Note this covers creation time only — an attacker altering modified or accessed times will not appear here.
Sanitised. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
File creation time changed:
RuleName: T1070.006
UtcTime: 2026-08-28 09:16:44.201
ProcessGuid: {a1b2c3d4-0000-0000-0000-00000000abcd}
ProcessId: 7412
Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
TargetFilename: C:\Windows\System32\wh.exe
CreationUtcTime: 2019-03-19 04:32:11.000
PreviousCreationUtcTime: 2026-08-28 09:14:09.001
User: CORP\jbrooks Everything else in the log line is context.
A date matching surrounding system filesDeliberately backdated to blend in. The classic timestomping pattern. A date far in the pastAlso blending in, more crudely. Most of the time it is one of these.
What gives it awayA file's creation time changed to match surrounding system files, usually shortly after it was written.
ATT&CK T1070.006What gives it awayA timestamp change on a script or executable in a web root or system directory.
ATT&CK T1070.006What gives it awaySeveral files in one directory having their timestamps changed by the same process in quick succession.
ATT&CK T1070.006Event | where Source == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' and EventID == 2 | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Image, TargetFilename, User | order by TimeGenerated desc Event | where Source == 'Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' and EventID == 2 | extend Proc = tostring(split(Image, '\\')[-1]) | where Proc in~ ('powershell.exe','cmd.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe') | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Proc, TargetFilename Changing a file's timestamps so it appears to have been created at a different time, usually one that matches the surrounding files. The point is to survive a look at a directory sorted by date, and to break timeline reconstruction during an investigation. Sysmon Event 2 records the change and, usefully, what the value was before.
No. It covers creation time only. Modified and accessed times can be changed without producing this event, and an attacker altering the file system record directly rather than through the normal API will not appear here either. It catches the common case, not every case.
Yes, but the list is short. Archive tools restoring original timestamps on extraction, backup software preserving metadata, and some installers all do it. That baseline is small and consistent enough to exclude by process name, which leaves a genuinely useful signal.
Last reviewed 28 August 2026