Taking over an existing account rather than creating a new one.
What gives it awayA reset of a privileged or dormant account by someone who does not normally perform resets, followed by a sign-in as that account.
ATT&CK T1098Nothing matches that yet. Tell us what you were looking for and it goes on the list.
Windows Security Log · Event 4724
Someone reset another account's password without knowing the old one — an administrative reset. It is routine at a help desk and it is also how an attacker takes over an existing account, so the pairing of who reset whose password is the thing to read.
Also written as 4724Event ID 4724
Someone with administrator rights changed an account's password without needing the old one. If you did not do this and it was not a family member with admin access, it means someone else had administrative control of the machine.
The distinction from 4723 matters: 4724 is a reset by someone else, 4723 is a user changing their own. A 4724 targeting a privileged or service account outside a change window is worth immediate attention, because it is account takeover and it is also disruptive enough to notice.
Sanitised. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
An attempt was made to reset an account's password.
Subject:
Security ID: CORP\helpdesk01
Account Name: helpdesk01
Account Domain: CORP
Logon ID: 0x3E9A11
Target Account:
Security ID: CORP\jbrooks
Account Name: jbrooks
Account Domain: CORP Everything else in the log line is context.
Most of the time it is one of these.
What gives it awayA reset of a privileged or dormant account by someone who does not normally perform resets, followed by a sign-in as that account.
ATT&CK T1098What gives it awayResets of administrator or executive accounts outside working hours, with no matching ticket.
ATT&CK T1531What gives it awayA reset of a service account outside a change window. Legitimate rotations are scheduled; opportunistic ones are not, and they usually break something visibly.
What gives it awayA reset performed shortly after an unusual inbound contact, for an account the requester cannot properly verify.
ATT&CK T1078SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4724 | project TimeGenerated, Computer, ResetAccount = TargetUserName, ResetBy = SubjectUserName | order by TimeGenerated desc SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4724 | summarize resets = count(), targets = dcount(TargetUserName) by SubjectUserName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | where targets > 5 4723 is a user changing their own password, which requires supplying the current one. 4724 is an administrator resetting someone else's without knowing it. That is why 4724 is the more security-relevant of the two — it is a takeover of access rather than a routine change.
Not necessarily. It is the ordinary result of a help desk resetting a forgotten password, or of self-service reset tooling. It is a concern when nobody requested the reset, when the account is privileged, or when a sign-in from an unfamiliar location follows shortly after.
Because creating an account and setting its password are separate operations in Windows. A 4720 followed by a 4724 is simply an account being finished so it can actually be used.
Last reviewed 28 August 2026