Privilege escalation after a foothold.
What gives it awayAn account added to Administrators by a session that arrived recently, particularly outside change windows.
ATT&CK T1098Nothing matches that yet. Tell us what you were looking for and it goes on the list.
Windows Security Log · Event 4732
An account was added to a local group. When that group is Administrators, this is the moment someone gained full control of the machine — and it is one of the highest-value single events in the entire Windows log.
Also written as 4732Event ID 4732
An account was given more power on this PC. If the group was Administrators, that account can now install software, change any setting, and read any file. If you did not do this, treat it as a break-in.
The group name arrives as a SID in some collection paths and as a name in others — resolve it before writing rules, or you will miss the ones that matter. Alert on Administrators, Remote Desktop Users, and Backup Operators at minimum. Correlate backwards to 4720: created, promoted, used is the sequence.
Sanitised. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
A member was added to a security-enabled local group.
Subject:
Security ID: CORP\jbrooks-adm
Account Name: jbrooks-adm
Account Domain: CORP
Logon ID: 0x3E9A11
Member:
Security ID: CORP\svc-update
Account Name: CN=svc-update,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=example
Group:
Security ID: BUILTIN\Administrators
Group Name: Administrators
Group Domain: Builtin
Additional Information:
Privileges: - Everything else in the log line is context.
AdministratorsFull control of the machine. The single most important value this field takes. Remote Desktop UsersPermission to sign in remotely. Combined with an exposed RDP port this is remote access. Backup OperatorsCan read and write any file regardless of its permissions — an administrator in all but name. UsersOrdinary membership. Routine. Most of the time it is one of these.
What gives it awayAn account added to Administrators by a session that arrived recently, particularly outside change windows.
ATT&CK T1098What gives it awayA 4720 and a 4732 for the same account within minutes, followed by a sign-in.
ATT&CK T1136.001What gives it awayAddition to Remote Desktop Users on a workstation that has no remote support requirement.
ATT&CK T1021.001What gives it awayAddition to Backup Operators for an account unrelated to backup software. It attracts far less attention than Administrators and grants nearly as much.
ATT&CK T1098SecurityEvent | where EventID in (4732, 4728, 4756) | where TargetUserName has_any ('Administrators','Domain Admins','Enterprise Admins','Remote Desktop Users','Backup Operators') | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Group = TargetUserName, Member = MemberName, AddedBy = SubjectUserName | order by TimeGenerated desc let created = SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4720 | project CreateTime = TimeGenerated, Computer, Account = TargetUserName;
let added = SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4732 | project AddTime = TimeGenerated, Group = TargetUserName, Account = tostring(split(MemberName, ',')[0]);
created | join kind=inner added on Account | where AddTime - CreateTime < 1h Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4732} -MaxEvents 100 | Select-Object TimeCreated, @{n='Group';e={$_.Properties[2].Value}}, @{n='Member';e={$_.Properties[0].Value}}, @{n='By';e={$_.Properties[6].Value}} index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 Group_Name="Administrators" | table _time dest Group_Name Member_Name Account_Name It means an account now has full control of that machine — able to install software, disable security tools, read every file, and create further accounts. Treat it as a compromise until proven otherwise: check who made the change in the Subject section, remove the membership, and look for what that account did afterwards.
4732 covers local groups, which exist on a single machine. 4728 covers domain global groups such as Domain Admins, which apply across the whole domain. Both matter, but a 4728 for a privileged domain group has a far wider blast radius.
Some collection paths cannot resolve the SID at the time the event is written, particularly for built-in groups or when the account is from another domain. The well-known SID S-1-5-32-544 is the local Administrators group — resolve these in your queries or you will miss the events you most care about.
In practice, close to it. Backup Operators can read and write any file on the machine regardless of its permissions, which includes the files that hold credentials. It attracts much less attention than Administrators, which is exactly why it is worth watching.
Last reviewed 28 August 2026