Removing a local account added earlier in the same intrusion.
What gives it awayA removal shortly after the matching 4732, from the same session, on a machine with no management tooling that touches local groups.
ATT&CK T1070Nothing matches that yet. Tell us what you were looking for and it goes on the list.
Windows Security Log · Event 4733
An account lost membership of a group on one machine. Most of these are not people at all — Group Policy and privileged access tooling rewrite local group membership on a schedule, which produces steady, harmless churn that hides the removals that do matter.
Also written as Event ID 47334733 local group removal
An account on this PC lost some of its permissions. If it was removed from Administrators, it can no longer install software or change system settings.
The dominant benign cause here is policy, not people. Restricted Groups and Group Policy Preferences both enforce local group membership at every refresh and will remove anything they do not expect, producing recurring 4732/4733 pairs on a fixed cycle. Privileged access management tooling does the same when it grants and reclaims temporary admin rights. Baseline that churn first — what remains is small and worth reading. Unlike a domain group, this takes effect at the next token creation on that machine rather than waiting on a Kerberos ticket.
Sanitised. Addresses come from the RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
A member was removed from a security-enabled local group.
Subject:
Security ID: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Account Name: WKS-014$
Account Domain: CORP
Logon ID: 0x3E7
Member:
Security ID: CORP\mchen
Account Name: -
Group:
Security ID: BUILTIN\Administrators
Group Name: Administrators
Group Domain: Builtin Everything else in the log line is context.
AdministratorsFull control of this machine being withdrawn. Remote Desktop UsersRemote sign-in access being removed. Backup OperatorsA group that grants file access regardless of permissions. SYSTEMAlmost always Group Policy or management tooling rather than a person. A named administratorA deliberate change, which should map to a request. Most of the time it is one of these.
What gives it awayA removal shortly after the matching 4732, from the same session, on a machine with no management tooling that touches local groups.
ATT&CK T1070What gives it awayA security or backup agent's service account removed from a local group it needs on one machine, which is quieter than disabling the agent outright.
ATT&CK T1562.001What gives it awayA legitimate administrator removed from the local Administrators group of a single host, with no corresponding policy change.
ATT&CK T1531SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4733 | where SubjectUserName != 'SYSTEM' | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Group = TargetUserName, Member = MemberName, RemovedBy = SubjectUserName SecurityEvent | where EventID in (4732, 4733) | summarize changes = count() by Computer, TargetUserName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1d) | where changes > 4 Get-LocalGroupMember -Group Administrators | Select-Object Name, PrincipalSource, ObjectClass Almost always Group Policy. Restricted Groups and Group Policy Preferences enforce a defined membership list at every policy refresh, adding what should be there and removing what should not. If something else adds a member out of band, you get a recurring add-remove cycle on the policy interval. Find the policy that manages that group rather than chasing the events.
At the next token creation on that machine — practically, the next sign-in. An already-signed-in user keeps the access their current token grants. This is different from a domain group, where an existing Kerberos ticket can carry stale membership for hours.
Because the account could not be resolved to a name when the event was written. That happens when the account has been deleted, when it belongs to another domain, or when the domain controller was unreachable. The SID is still the reliable identifier — resolve it separately, and note that a SID that will not resolve at all usually means the account is gone.
Last reviewed 28 August 2026